The Art of Negotiation: mind games and emotional intelligence – ABC News

Sana Qadar: Round, rectangular, triangular or square, a table is a table, right? No. A table is a symbol. In 1968, the Vietnam War had been raging for more than a decade. The disastrous Tet Offensive that year was a turning point. The various parties were finally ready to start negotiating for peace, but first, another battle needed to be won; the Battle of the Tables.
Jeffrey Michaels: So there were four parties in these negotiations, there were the Americans, there were the South Vietnamese government…
Sana Qadar: These two were allies.
Jeffrey Michaels: There was the North Vietnamese government and there was the Vietcong or the southern insurgents.
Sana Qadar: And these two were allies.
Jeffrey Michaels: And basically the issue with the tables is a dispute over how these southern insurgents would be represented. So, initially the Americans proposed a triangular table with the US and the South Vietnamese each having one side, and the North Vietnamese and the southern insurgents having a third side.
Sana Qadar: But the North Vietnamese and southern insurgents found this proposal unacceptable.
Jeffrey Michaels: Because it meant that they got one side versus the Americans and the South Vietnamese, who each had a side of their own.
Sana Qadar: So there would be out-powered, symbolically I guess.
Jeffrey Michaels: Symbolically it just didn't look very good.
Sana Qadar: Okay, triangle? Out. Next suggestion, a square table, so each party gets an equal side.
Jeffrey Michaels: That was unacceptable to the Americans and South Vietnamese because, again, they said 'we don't want these southern insurgents having an equal side at the table, it gives them too much legitimacy.
Sana Qadar: Square? Out.
Jeffrey Michaels: Next was a suggestion for two rectangular tables that were separated from one another so that neither side would be touching one another. That was an American suggestion. That was deemed unacceptable. I'm not entirely clear why it was unacceptable.
Sana Qadar: Two rectangles? Also out.
Jeffrey Michaels: Next was a North Vietnamese suggestion of a round table.
Sana Qadar: The Americans were actually on board with this one, but their allies the South Vietnamese government weren't because, again, a circle symbolises equality between all of the parties, including the insurgents.
Jeffrey Michaels: So from there then the Americans proposed six other variants of a round table, the most important of those was basically a round table with a line drawn across the middle.
Sana Qadar: This time the North Vietnamese and southern insurgents nixed that idea.
Jeffrey Michaels: Again, I'm not entirely clear why.
Sana Qadar: This back-and-forth carried on for 10 long weeks, after which finally the party settled on an arrangement. There would be a round table after all, but there would be two rectangular tables off to either side of the circle, like ears of the side of a head.
Jeffrey Michaels: Which would be occupied by secretaries, so literally a physical separation between both sides.
Sana Qadar: But everyone would be sitting around the circular table?
Jeffrey Michaels: They would be sitting around the circular table but there would be the separation of these two rectangular tables, more or less sticking out on either side.
Sana Qadar: Incredible.
You're listening to All in the Mind, I'm Sana Qadar. This episode is not entirely about tables, I promise, but it is about negotiation; how to get what you want and get in the head of your opponents.
George Kohlrieser: We got a call that there was a hostage-taking at a local hospital, so I got in and we were getting nowhere for several minutes until I asked a question, 'Sam, how do you want your children to remember you?' And he screamed, 'Don't talk about my kids!'
Joshua Weiss: One of my colleagues many years ago wrote an article called 'Negotiating with Your Wife or Negotiating with the Russians; Is it Really That Different?'
Sana Qadar: Is it?
Joshua Weiss: Well, his answer was not really.
Sana Qadar: Today, from diplomacy, to business, to hostage situations, we dive into the psychology of negotiation, the details that can affect our mindset, what to do if you are up against a much more powerful opponent, and whether playing hardball is ever an effective strategy.
The thing about the table business during the Vietnam War was that, sure, it was about the symbolism and how it represented the various parties, but it was also a stalling tactic.
Jeffrey Michaels: Oh, the Americans were extremely frustrated. I mean, each party had its own reasons for doing it, I think the Americans were really the ones who most wanted to get these negotiations going.
Sana Qadar: The whole thing was also a farse.
Jeffrey Michaels: Well, the real joke about all this is at the end, none of this really mattered.
Sana Qadar: This is Jeffrey Michaels, Senior Fellow at the Barcelona Institute of International Studies.
Jeffrey Michaels: You have these parties sitting around this table over the next years, but basically nothing actually happens. The real negotiations are going on separately in Paris between the North Vietnamese and the Americans.
Sana Qadar: And it's not until 1975 that the war actually ends, seven years after the 10-week long Battle of the Tables.
Was anything agreed upon around that table or was it completely a useless arena?
Jeffrey Michaels: It was a useless arena, it was basically a place for both sides to read out statements denouncing the other side.
Barbara Keyes: Respect and pride and fear of humiliation play kind of astonishing roles in international relations.
Sana Qadar: This is Professor of History Barbara Keyes from Durham University in the UK. She says when diplomats in countries want to play nice, there are tokens of respect that can be offered.
Barbara Keyes: So you might throw a particularly lavish banquet for these people, and it's the people who are eating the food and drinking the drink, they are the ones getting the toasts, but it's a way of expressing respect for the country. This is something diplomats often do as a way to stoke the egos.
Sana Qadar: But when countries and diplomats don't want to play nice, details like food and drink and tables and chairs can be used to intimidate or frustrate. The Battle of the Tables during the Vietnam War was one example, but here's another. In 1991, US Secretary of State at the time James Baker was involved in marathon negotiations with Syrian president at the time Hafez al-Assad. The physical and environmental details were used to maximum effect in these talks.
Barbara Keyes: And the way Baker described one particular session, it sounded really like a kind of torture session; almost 10 hours during which he had to sit in a particularly uncomfortable chair, one with these really deep cushions, so he sort of sunk deep into this chair, and he's got to turn sideways to face Assad, and he gets this terrible crick in his neck. And meanwhile, the room is being made really stuffy and warm, and he's being plied with lemonade and coffee, and he's thirsty, so he drinks. But what he says is that Assad was practising bladder diplomacy because I guess for men the idea is that you display weakness if you ask to use the bathroom…
Sana Qadar: Oh my gosh!
Barbara Keyes: Baker is trying very hard not to have to use the bathroom, although in the end he does not make it the entire 10 hours. But it's kind of an odd thing that Baker would feel that way because what does it have to do with the power of the United States if the country's Secretary of State can or cannot go 10 hours without a bathroom break? What's so terrible about a bathroom break? It's about personal stamina and this kind of mono-e-mono thing with Assad, it's translated into an indicator of America's strength of will.
Sana Qadar: That feels really juvenile. Are these tactics really fair, do you think? Do tactics like that persist today or is that from a different era?
Barbara Keyes: Oh, I'm sure they're still…yeah, people still do it. I'm remembering one relatively recent thing that happened, this is a few years ago, where Putin was negotiating with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and knowing that Merkel is afraid of dogs, Putin allows his large dog into the room as a way of intimidating Merkel. So, all these sorts of things, yes, in fact there are diplomats even now researching ways to try to manipulate their counterparts in these ways.
Sana Qadar: Right, so they are not above being juvenile in many ways.
Barbara Keyes: Yes, exactly.
Sana Qadar: But would such behaviour fly elsewhere, like in business? Maybe, but you've got to remember that negotiating is about relationships too, not just your immediate objectives.
Joshua Weiss: You know, how you come into a negotiation matters greatly, and if you see every problem as a nail, you use a hammer, but that's not very helpful.
Sana Qadar: This is Josh Weiss, director of the Leadership and Negotiation Master's Program at Bay Path University and co-founder of the Global Negotiation Initiative at Harvard University.
Joshua Weiss: Especially in negotiations where we have to negotiate with the same people or the same organisations over and over again…and I do a lot of training in negotiation, and when I ask the question; how many of your negotiations are, say, one-off negotiations, over a car or home or something like that, versus negotiating with the same people over and over again in a business context or whatever it might be, and usually people say about 85% of their negotiations are with the same people or the same organisations over and over again. So if that's the case, then how will you negotiate matters greatly? If you treat the other with disdain, if you try to manipulate them, it might work in that initial negotiation, you might gain a little more but people figure it out eventually. So coming into a negotiation and seeing the other negotiator as sort of a problem-solving partner, to me is the best way to do it.
Sana Qadar: It's why emotional intelligence, Josh says, is one of the most important skills to have if you want to be an effective negotiator. Yes, preparation, adaptability, patience are all part of the mix, but people really tend to underestimate the role emotions play.
Joshua Weiss: You know, there's a popular misconception, at least here in the United States for sure, that you need to keep emotions out of negotiation. In fact if you look at the history of negotiation, the study of negotiation really emerged in the world of economics and the discipline of economics. And in that world, you are a rational actor, and if somebody is going to insult you but give you an extra $10, in a rational actor model they would say get insulted and take the money. We know that that's not how human beings work. So behavioural psychologists came along 15 years later and said, hey, you're missing the boat, emotions are critical to negotiation and they have to have a role, so you cannot keep them out. And in fact if you try to keep them out and suppress them, that's when they become a problem.
Sana Qadar: But emotional intelligence means knowing the right way to express those emotions and the less right way, shall we say. Here's an example of what not to do, as witnessed by Josh's colleague who was working on a potential merger between two companies.
Joshua Weiss: And she had helped them prepare, and she was sitting in the room to give them advice at the breaks and things like that. And the two companies were relatively equal in size and stature and things like that, so that wasn't a huge power differential. And the other side came in and there were three negotiators, and the lead negotiator for the other side was a guy named Oliver. And Oliver sat down and he took the negotiation over. He was very pedantic in his approach, he was demanding, he was pounding the table, he was doing all the things that if you read a book that says 'get whatever you want in negotiation every time' or 'how to take advantage of everybody all the time', it was textbook. And the company that my colleague was working with tried to redirect and tried to move things back toward a little more of a problem-solving kind of way, doing things like that, and Oliver wasn't having it. But what they also noticed was his two colleagues seemed taken aback by his own behaviour. They didn't seem to be on the same page, et cetera.
Finally Oliver said, 'Look, this is a take-it-or-leave-it kind of thing,' and he started jamming papers into his briefcase, getting very frustrated, and essentially stood up, slammed his briefcase closed and then went to a door, opened the door and slammed it behind him. He of course thought he was leaving. He ended up going into a walk-in closet. And the funny thing is he ended up staying in there because he was so embarrassed by his own behaviour.
Sana Qadar: Oh my gosh, wow.
Joshua Weiss: Now, what was interesting about the story was that as he is in the closet and the other negotiators, all the other negotiators are laughing, one of them from my colleague's side took the opportunity to say, 'Hey, we think we can do this differently, we think there's a deal to be had here, but we can't go at the problem this way. Are you guys willing to listen?' And they said yes. And meanwhile Oliver sheepishly came out of the closet and sort of was relegated to the side, and they were able to reach a deal.
And so I think that there's a number of things that go in there. You know, a lot of times people think there's a certain way that they are supposed to act in negotiation, and there's not, there's not a cookie-cutter model for this. For me, negotiation is much more about you, how you react and respond, and the fact that the team was not reacting and responding in the way that Oliver wanted essentially sent the message that this isn't going to work, and really in many ways Oliver didn't know what to do because I think in the past Oliver had probably tried that and it was probably quite effective, because a lot of times when you create that kind of level of anxiety, people want to relieve the anxiety, so they just agree, and then they walk out and kick themselves. But in this instance because they were prepared, they had worked with my colleague, they didn't do that. And Oliver didn't know what to do, and that's the problem with the games and the tricks and all the other stuff that you can read about, is if the other side knows what they're doing, it doesn't work.
Sana Qadar: So how do you leverage your emotions effectively then if we are not meant to push aside anger or whatever else that we're feeling?
Joshua Weiss: Well, I think it's really about becoming comfortable with them. Recently I was in negotiation in the last couple of months, and I remember saying to somebody, 'Look, I'm really frustrated by the way this is going.' Now, I didn't lose my temper but I was still able to communicate that this is not how I imagined this was going or this might go, and in fact the way in which we are engaging in this negotiation is frustrating for me. Now, that still communicates to the other that I'm frustrated but I didn't blow the process up, I think that's the difference.
And when I talk to people about negotiation, dealing with conflict, people always say to me; if I could just figure out how to compartmentalise, put aside the emotional piece of all of this, it would be so much easier. And I say; I understand and you can't. So the alternative is learn about yourself, know what your triggers are. Like, for me when I go into a negotiation, if I'm dealing with somebody who is really condescending, that's my trigger. I had a guy about a year ago say to me, 'You're clearly not smart enough to understand what I'm telling you, so let me break it down more simply for you.' And I took a deep breath and I said, 'Why don't you do that, let's give it a shot and see what I'm missing.' And that's about my reaction, because lots of people could have lost it right then and there, and had I not spent much of my life doing this, I probably would have as well.
Sana Qadar: And did that work out well, how did that go?
Joshua Weiss: It did go okay, and we did reach an agreement and I did, by the way, give him a little feedback after the fact and I said, 'Listen, I've got to tell you, I understand what you were saying but the way you said it was pretty condescending.' And he said, 'I guess I could see how that might be the case.'
Sana Qadar: How very emotionally mature of both of you.
Joshua Weiss: Again, I think a lot of it is somebody has to break the cycle.
Sana Qadar: How much harder is it negotiating and doing all of this when there is a vast power difference at play between the two parties?
Joshua Weiss: It's the issue for most people that creates the biggest challenge, and understandably. Part of it is how people view power, because power to me is a bit different in negotiation, it's relational. So in some instances your boss has the ability to say 'you need to do this or you lose your job', it's a very clear-cut kind of scenario. In negotiation it's a little bit different. The other side can force you to do something and they might have that power over you, but a lot of times when you wield power in that way, you have to remember there is an ongoing relationship and there's an implementation. When I see parties who wield power to their maximum effect, what often ends up happening is the weaker party, during the implementation they drag their feet, they don't actually do what they said they would do because they didn't want it.
But one of the best things that you can do in dealing with power when you don't have it is to understand something we call your BATNA, which is your 'best alternative to a negotiated agreement'. And it's a pretty simple idea, it basically means if you don't reach agreement in this negotiation, what are you going to do? And a lot of people don't answer that question, they don't think that through. But when you do think that through, sometimes you realise, you know, there's actually something else I could do here, or BATNAs are not static, sometimes you can actually improve your BATNA by thinking and doing things a little bit differently. Can I share an example of what I mean?
Sana Qadar: Yes please, yeah absolutely.
Joshua Weiss: So in my book there's probably one of my favourite cases is an example of a company called Innoagri, which was involved in agricultural production, and they were based in China. And in order to do their work they needed this particular machine, and the machine that they had had basically lived its full cycle and they had to buy another one. Now, there was one company in all of China called Solantar who sold this equipment. So we have a sole supplier issue, which is a very big power differential. And, to complicate matters further, when we talk about culture, the Chinese government often puts restrictions on the ability to import and things like that, so you couldn't import the equipment.
So these folks at Innoagri sat down with people at Solantar and the people at Solantar were really playing hardball, they were charging them an exorbitant fee for this machine. Basically the people at Innoagri are like, if we pay this we're going to go out of business. So they called in a colleague of mine, a negotiation consultant, and they said, 'Here's the problem we have, what do we do?' And he listened to them and he said, 'Well, what's your BATNA?' And they said, 'Well, we don't have one, it's a sole supplier situation.'
He said, 'Here's what I want you to do. I want you to imagine that Solantar has gone out of business and you still have to meet your need for this new equipment.' And they looked at him like he was crazy, and they were like, 'But we have enough problems and now you're telling us to get rid of the one company that sells are this equipment.' He said, 'I'll be back in three days, take care, good luck.' And they started to brainstorm and think creatively, and finally somebody said, 'Do you think there is another company in China that maybe owns this equipment and would be willing to sell as their used equipment?'
So this guy goes off and it turns out that he found a company that had bought a piece of this equipment a couple of years ago, so he reached out to them and they said, 'Well, it's funny that you should get in touch because we are actually changing our business and we need to get rid of this thing.' So all of the sudden they now have a BATNA, right? And psychologically it changed everything for them. So they went back and they met with Solantar and they said, 'Look, we have come up with an alternative here, this what we are offering,' et cetera and they said, 'Okay, well I guess we are going to have to adjust our approach to this negotiation,' they came way down and they sort of levelled the playing field and got a deal done.
Sana Qadar: Saved by the BATNA.
Joshua Weiss: Saved by the BATNA, exactly.
Sana Qadar: Before we move on from talking about negotiation in business, I want to throw one smaller-scale example at Josh, a scenario more of us might find ourselves in, where we are pitching to a client rather than negotiating big deals between businesses.
So this is an anecdote I heard from an acquaintance about a kind of high-risk unconventional strategy a friend of his would use. His friend was an ad man, so he would often be pitching to new clients. And his strategy was to go in and try to mess up somehow in the beginning, so maybe the slides would be all wrong on his presentation, he'd fumble somehow, and the idea there was to get everyone to feel sorry for him, get them onside that way, and then deliver a killer pitch.
What do you make of a strategy like that?
Joshua Weiss: Well, there's a very interesting book by a guy named Robert Cialdini, it was called Influence, he wrote it back in the 1980s, and he highlights six principles of influence and persuasion, and one of them is likability. And I think that when you make yourself vulnerable like that, when you get someone to feel for you and you set expectations very low and then you flip it around very quickly, I can see that being a very effective strategy.
I'm a big fan of the unorthodox. I actually do a lot of my negotiations now out of the office, going for walks with people, having lunch with people, it takes the pressure off, it changes the dynamic dramatically. I think if you can find ways of connecting with the other, whether it's some self-deprecating humour or whatever it might be, the likability factor matters a lot. People do business with people they like, and so I'm sensing that's what your friend's friend was doing, is getting people to kind of relate to him in a certain kind of way.
Sana Qadar: And the reason I thought that was pretty high risk is because my mind immediately went to I can't imagine a woman getting away with that or a person of colour getting away with that, it kind of struck me as effective for that person who might have been a white man.
Joshua Weiss: That's right, and you're right, there are a whole host of other elements and dimensions that women need to think about. There is a great book called The Shadow Negotiation that was written by my colleague Debbie Kolb, and she talks in that book about how women are always negotiating the substance of the negotiation, but the shadow negotiation is that you are also constantly negotiating the relationship. Men don't have to do it as much, but women and people of colour are constantly doing that and getting a sense of 'what do they think of me', 'what other elements are at play here', that a white male or somebody else wouldn't have to deal with.
Sana Qadar: We've talked about dirty tricks and diplomatic negotiations, we've talked about emotional intelligence and business negotiations. Hostage negotiations are a very different ball game.
George Kohlrieser: Okay, so number one, you have the pressure of getting something resolved within a short time, so you have the police and the SWAT team generally as part of the backup, so there is more pressure. And the success rate is extremely high because the desires of the hostage-taker can be pretty quickly identified (and I'll explain how that works), then you can find the concession to get them out. In business negotiation it's far more complicated, and in diplomatic negotiations, mamma-mia, it's even more complicated, with all the various parties that are involved.
Sana Qadar: This is George Kohlrieser, a Professor of Leadership and Organisational Behaviour at IMD Business School in Lausanne, Switzerland. He's also a former hostage negotiator. His first case was back in the '70s, not long after he had finished his PhD in mediation. He was working in an experimental program, bringing together the police and psychologists to deal with domestic violence situations. One day at the local hospital, a man took a nurse hostage.
George Kohlrieser: He had ran all the doctors out of the emergency room he was taken because of a stab wound from his ex-wife. And the lieutenant quickly decided no teargas, no kicking in the door, we don't want to trigger him, we need somebody to go into that room and talk him down. So I got in. Sam (that was his name) did not want to see me. He was screaming and yelling, holding scissors to Sheila's throat (that was the nurse's name). After about three minutes he cut her throat, not the jugular but the side. And then he stepped back, startled I think, and started to come around that table towards me with the scissors. Now, there was no way to throw my body at his feet and take him down, he was bigger, there wasn't time to call the police in, so the only thing I could do was bond and talk to him, which I did.
And we were getting nowhere for several minutes until I asked the question, 'Sam, how do you want your children to remember you?' And he screamed, 'Don't talk about my kids, I'll kill them, I'll kill you, I have nothing to live for!' And that was the start of the negotiation. This was not the response I wanted, but we were now in part of the dialogue. So I came back again, 'Sam, we have to talk about your kids. Do you want them to remember you as a murderer?' 'I said don't talk about my kids! Do you want to die right now?' 'No, Sam, I don't want to die, I want to get you out of here to see your kids again.' And he had the scissors now to my throat, but he never cut my skin. He started to de-escalate. Within about 10 minutes I managed to get him to let Sheila go.
Sana Qadar: Sheila was the nurse, and thankfully she survived the ordeal.
George Kohlrieser: And within another short time we reached a deal which was, 'Sam, if you go out voluntarily now, I will go with you to see your kids and tell them you did so because of them. You're probably going to go to prison, this is a felony, this is serious, but I will come to prison and see you in reconciliation with your kids and I'll talk to the judge to see if we can get your sentence reduced.' And he bought the deal. So that was the first experience I had in dealing with a hostage situation.
Sana Qadar: Keeping your cool in a situation like that feels like a superhuman skill, but George says it can be trained.
George Kohlrieser: The fundamental thing is two parts. One, is to control your mind's eye, the inner state that you focus on, what do you focus on? And secondly, manage your emotions. You have to you be able to manage your emotions to hold onto the bond, even when you're attacked. So when somebody is screaming and yelling, and I've heard so much garbage shouted, conspiracy theories, destructive things, but I just have to let it go by. And another technique that's very important is paraphrasing. 'Let me see if I understand, this is what you're saying?' And if they say yes, you go on, if they say no, 'Well, can you help me understand what it is you are saying?' And sometimes we will intentionally distort the paraphrase to get them to start thinking and be aware that you are actually listening. So there are all kinds of subtle techniques that can be used in this whole listening process, but the heart of it is listening.
Sana Qadar: And George says all hostage negotiators basically follow the same three steps: number one, build a bond.
George Kohlrieser: Even if you don't like the person, you don't have to you like them to bond to them, you have to you only have a common goal.
Sana Qadar: Step two, listen to the pain points.
George Kohlrieser: Happy people don't take hostages. So, what's the motivation behind this?
Sana Qadar: And step three, make concessions. All of which he did with Sam, that first hostage-taker he negotiated with. George says with these three steps, the success rate in hostage negotiations is 95%, as measured by Interpol and the FBI.
George Kohlrieser: It's amazing. The art and science of hostage negotiation is a very advanced form of influencing and persuasion. Hostage negotiators never tell hostage takers to come out. You don't give an order, you give choice. The only risk is the 5% where it doesn't succeed, and let's talk about that for a second. 5% of the time it doesn't succeed and this is generally people wanting to commit suicide by police. So they don't want anything. One of the big indicators of whether you are going to succeed or not is what does the person desire. If they don't want anything, it's a high risk for police suicide, or for them acting in some very destructive ways. So the whole point is how to listen and then be able to find a way out with that concession making.
Sana Qadar: Empathy, listening, relationship building, emotional intelligence. These are the words that come up again and again, whether we are talking about negotiating effectively in diplomacy, business or hostage situations.
Barbara Keyes: Good negotiators will have a sense of the psychology of their counterpart, and if we think about the ways that we as people who just have normal jobs could learn from negotiators, one lesson would be to talk to people face-to-face. Everyday interpersonal interactions build a sense of connection and that can make all kinds of things about work easier, and it's really one reason to go back to the office after the pandemic because you do create deeper bonds with people in person. And studies have shown that if you ask for something in person, you are much more likely to get it than if you email, and it's because people don't make decisions merely based on pros and cons, they make decisions based on things like, you know, do I feel personally obligated, or do I want to please the person who is asking me? And those are factors that you can generate more powerfully when you are right in front of the person. It's much harder for them to say no to you if they are saying it to your face. So I'm always reminding myself that if it's important, go and do it in person, never right before lunch, and of course try to establish a bit of a report before you ask.
Joshua Weiss: Being a very good negotiator is not a destination, it's a journey. I've been doing this for 30 years and I keep learning something new every day, and it's fascinating. And once you start to dig in to all of this, you'll realise that you've been missing such an important part of not only your business life but the skills that go along with negotiation are applicable in the world around you. So, it's life changing stuff because these problems can be handled, these challenges…we have to move away from picking up the phone and calling a lawyer every time there's a problem. You can do it, you need the skills, the knowledge and the ability. And if you invest in it, you won't be sorry, that much I can tell you.
Sana Qadar: That's Joshua Weiss, author of The Book of Real-World Negotiations: Successful Strategies from Business, Government, and Daily Life.
You also heard from Professor of History Barbara Keyes from Durham University, former hostage negotiator George Kohlrieser, and Jeffrey Michaels from the Barcelona Institute of International Studies.
Thanks to producer Jennifer Leake, and sound engineer Russell Stapleton. I'm Sana Qadar, thanks for listening, I'll catch you next time.
You might not think of yourself as a negotiator but big or small we all negotiate daily.
Getting better at it could make your life easier.
So what's the most effective way to negotiate?
Is playing hardball ever a useful strategy?
And what do you do when you're at a power disadvantage?
Jeffrey Michaels — Senior fellow at The Barcelona Institute of International Studies
Josh Weiss – Director of the Leadership and Negotiation Master's Program at Bay Path University and co-founder of the Global Negotiation Initiative at Harvard University
Barbara Keyes – Professor of History at Durham University
George Kohlrieser – Professor of Leadership and Organisational Behaviour at IMD Business School
 Sana Qadar
Published: with Sana Qadar
Published: with Sana Qadar
Published: with Sana Qadar
Published: with Sana Qadar
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